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KEYNOTE DISCUSSION: JUST WHAT EXACTLY DOES A
TRANSACTIONAL LAWYER DO?
WILLIAM J. CARNEY1

MODERATOR

RONALD J. GILSON2
GEORGE W. DENT, JR.

REFLECTIONS ON V ALUE C REATION
3

REFLECTIONS ON E NTERPRISE A RCHITECTS
WILLIAM J. CARNEY
Introduction

I'm Bill Carney from Emory, and I want to welcome you to our program. I hope
you're enjoying it. My job today is just to serve as moderator for two people who have sort
of different views, or have held different views of what lawyers do and what we ought to be
training them for. Ron Gilson wrote what I think we have to call the seminal article in this
area way back in 1984,4 and people have been reacting to it ever since. Notwithstanding the
fact that we are casebook competitors, I cite his article in my Mergers casebook.5
Ron graduated from Washington University, got his J.D. from Yale, and practiced in
San Francisco as a mergers and acquisitions lawyer before he went to Stanford. And not
only has he gone to Stanford, he's gone to Columbia. He holds chairs in both places, so he
leads more of a peripatetic life than I could possibly stand, but he's younger and stronger.
And I will introduce George Dent now, and we won't have to go through that later.
George Dent has taught at New York University, Cardozo, and New York Law School
before he joined the Case Western faculty in 1990. He clerked for Judge Hayes of the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals and practiced law with Debevoise. He's the faculty
Bill Carney is a Charles Howard Candler Professor of Law at Emory University School of Law, where he
teaches Business Associations, Securities Regulation, and Corporate Law. Prior to joining the Emory faculty,
Professor Carney was a partner at Holland & Hart in Denver and a professor at the University of Wyoming. He
has previously served as chair of the Corporate Code Revision Committee and as a member of the Executive
Committee of the Corporate Section of the State Bar of Georgia. He received his B.A. from Yale University in
1969, and his LL.B. from Yale University in 1962. He can be reached at lawwjc@law.emory.edu.
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supervisor for the Business Organizations Concentration and an Associate Director of the
Center for Business Law and Regulation at Case Western Reserve University Law School.
I thought the way we would start this is to give each of the speakers five to ten
minutes to talk about the thesis of their original articles. Then to the extent that they want
to react to each other at that time, let them have a go at it and follow with some questions,
first from me and then from you. So Ron, I think you go first. You've got pride of place
because you've got the oldest and most seminal article.

RONALD J. GILSON
REFLECTIONS ON V ALUE C REATION
That is a funny kind of pride. As an ordering principle, I’d rather focus on seminal
than old, but I'll take what I can get. I'm extremely grateful for Bill's kind invitation to speak
at the conference on "Transactional Education: What's Next?," especially in front of so
many people. When I started worrying about training business lawyers in the early 1980s,
the real truth is that we could have had this meeting in a closet, and there would have been
extra room for refreshments. The number of attendees today is a testimonial to what
everyone in the room has caused to happen: Education in business lawyering as opposed to
litigation has become a central feature of legal education today.
I'm also delighted to share a panel with Bill Carney and George Dent. We’ve all had
to develop personal techniques for dealing with information overload -- the rush of stuff
that the Social Science Research Network puts across our computer screens every morning.
Let me suggest one easy approach that I use. If you see an article by either Bill or George,
just read it. It's an easy screen, it saves time, and you will always learn something.
I will start by talking briefly about where the Value Creation6 article came from,
because a little bit of the history helps me frame the areas where I agree with George and the
one area where we may part company. In effect, this article was my dissertation from
practice. After law school and clerking, I went to work for a small San Francisco boutique
firm. I was the fourteenth lawyer, and that was my first experience with, as Bill puts it, pride
of place. I held down the very last position on the letterhead. The firm’s way of training
people was to hand them a deal. I did my first acquisition six weeks after I showed up at the
firm. Seven years later, I thought I was doing it reasonably well, and I left practice for
teaching because I wanted to figure out what it was, analytically, that I was actually doing.
So the seven years of practice was the coursework, and the article we're talking about now
was the dissertation. I think it's no coincidence that if you look at Bill’s, George’s and my
backgrounds as described in the biographical document that has been distributed, there is a
fair amount of overlap in our career pattern.
I can state the thesis of the Value Creation piece in two sentences. Business lawyers
have to be able to create value. If the transaction or the organization for whom we are
working isn't worth more as a result of our participation, then we're going to lose the work,
and we're not going to have very much fun. As an anecdotal piece of evidence, consider the
role of lawyers in residential real estate sales in California. In fact, lawyers nor have no role.
6

See Gilson, supra note 4.
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Title companies and real estate agents have completely displaced business lawyers in
purchase and sale of people’s homes, which I expect has happened everywhere that
regulatory restrictions does not protect lawyers’ turf. Business lawyers lost the work because
we did not offer value in that setting. I thought I could set up the conversation by
highlighting a couple of things I've learned over the 25 years and which helpfully expand
Value Creation’s thesis. These then can set up the places where I entirely agree with George's
lovely article,7 and at least frame one place where perhaps we disagree.
Simultaneity
My first point concerns something that is buried in Value Creation but to which I
accorded far less attention than I have come to believe that it deserves. I now think of the
buried concept as “simultaneity.” Clients care a lot about creating value in a transaction, but
they also care a lot about how that value is divided. The problem is that creating value, the
win-win concept that is both right and incomplete in critical respect, and dividing it, the
distributive bargaining element, take place at exactly the same time. At the same time
everyone is talking about how to cooperate to make the transaction succeed, they are also
anticipating how the success is going to be shared, and all other things equal, each party
wants more.
The difficulty caused by the simultaneous creation and division of value is that a lot
of the techniques we use to create value – for example, open and honest sharing of what our
needs are, what things we value, honest collaboration – can profoundly reduce the ability to
engage in distributive bargaining. For example, gains from trade arise from the parties
sharing the importance to them of different elements of what is to be contributed or
exchanged; identifying differences in valuation provide the opportunity for gains from trade.
However, one party can improve its bargaining position if it strategically misrepresents its
valuation. In equilibrium, both parties will misrepresent their real preferences, which
interferes with value creation. That conflict, and the importance of structuring negotiations
to separate value creation and division, is underemphasized in Value Creation. More
important than my underestimating the point some 25 years ago, I believe the difficulty
posed by simultaneity continues to be underestimated. No one, whether it's the law school
negotiation teachers or the business school game theorists, does a very good job in
addressing how you engineer a transactional structure that generates acoustic separation
between creating value and dividing it. The good news is that I think practitioners have
figured out some of the problem For example, the standard joint venture between a large
pharmaceutical and a small biotech, a collaborative governance structure in a set of formal
nested options, does it reasonably well. Nonetheless, developing cooperation in an
inherently competitive environment remains a very difficult problem. But better late than
never. It is taking up a lot of my time now.8
A Creature of Its Time
The second point that helps frame the extent to which George and I may differ is
that we need to be clear about context. I wrote Value Creation in 1984. Let me set its context
7

George W. Dent, Jr., Business Lawyers as Enterprise Architects, 64 BUS. LAW. 279 (2009).
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Cooperation, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (2009); Ronald J Gilson, Robert E. Scott & Charles Sabel, Braiding: The
Interaction of Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377 (2010); Ronald
J. Gilson, Robert E. Scott & Charles Sabel, Contract, Uncertainty and Innovation, in RULES FOR GROWTH (Robert
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in a three sentence intellectual history. In 1984 we were still in the process of financial
economics turning into serious microeconomics; most of what I think of now as managerial
economics barely existed then. George correctly points out in his article that the economic
theory of agency, which does not figure prominently in Value Creation, is central to
understanding the problems that business lawyers address. But William Meckling and
Michael Jensen's truly seminal piece that first applied agency analysis to problems that
concerned business lawyers appeared only in 1976 in the Journal of Financial Economics,
which Jensen had started just a couple of years before.9 At the same time, Oliver Williamson
was still at the early stages of turning Ronald Coase's line drawing into transactional cost
economics, which would give us a both a positive and normative handle on how
organizations and transactions are shaped.
Since Value Creation appeared we have seen an explosion in the range of
organizational forms and transactions that are the tools through which business lawyers now
create value, and in the range of positive theory that helps us think about how to do it. So
the methodology that's reflected in the Value Creation piece, and its use of the capital asset
pricing model as a heuristic, was a creature of its time. And George properly describes the
broader range of theory that is now available to business lawyers. Our tool kit has gotten
much, much richer.
The Role of Theory in Training Lawyers
This brings me to my final point, which concerns how much help a currently
popular body of theory will turn out to provide. I'm of two minds about the role of the
cognitive and social psychology literatures that have been translated by non-psychologists
into behavioral economics and behavioral finance. I am of two minds because in the 1985
first edition of my The Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions,10 I included, I believe
for the first time in business law teaching materials, a lengthy excerpt from work by Amos
Tversky and Daniel Kahneman11 because I thought there was great promise in
understanding the extent to which and how the non-analytic part of people's behavior bears
on business practices. Now, after watching the field grow in influence,12 I think the promise
remains relatively empty. We don't have techniques for identifying which cognitive biases
are operative in what circumstances and, more important, there is no reason to believe that
only one bias can be operating at the same time. We need something like an arbitrage
pricing model for biases that we don't yet have, and frankly, I don't think we will ever have.
To be sure, it is helpful to know that in some circumstances individuals value losses more
than gains – if we believe the party on the other side of a transaction has this bias and our
client does not, an opportunity to create value appears. But it remains uncertain when
business professionals suffer from such biases and whether individuals can learn to
overcome them. For now at least, the payoff to this work for business lawyers remains in
the future.

Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
9
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Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981).

Daniel Kahneman was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics Science in 1990 for this work. Amos Tversky
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That brings me to the one point where George and I may have a difference. It
relates to how we train lawyers, and the role of theory in teaching how transaction cost
engineering, or architecture as George would put it, creates value. In my view, the starting
point is that law as a discipline simply does not have a methodology that addresses the
relationship between transaction or organization structure and value. The absence of that
link is underscored by the fact that Oliver Williamson and Elinor Ostrom received the
Nobel Prize in Economic Science last year for their exploration of just that gap. The
absence of a methodology in law that explains the sources of value may explain why, in the
end, Steve Schwartz seems to think that we end up being regulatory technicians.
The point is that law professors have to go elsewhere in the university to find the
underlying theory that identifies how we can teach the skills for creating value. Without that
underlying theory, we end up teaching a series of anecdotes, with little analytic rigor, and
without the students having the means to test in their own minds the cohesiveness or
coherence of what we teach. To put it differently, what distinguishes a professional school
from, on the one hand, a graduate department, and on the other, a trade school, is the
obligation to take cutting edge theory that's largely been developed elsewhere in the
university and bring it to bear on the real world in which our students will and our alumni
are practicing. At one level it's only arbitrage, but on another, when the theory comes out of
the law school tied to things that happen in the real world, the theory is better for it as well.
So, I agree with George that the structures that we now create and the techniques
that we now use are dramatically broader than those that we were addressing in 1984.
Where I will dig my heels in, and here I'm not sure George disagrees, but we will find out, is
what the task is in the end. In my view the task remains helping our clients create value.

GEORGE W. DENT, JR.
REFLECTIONS ON E NTERPRISE A RCHITECTS
Taxonomy
First, just a little point of taxonomy which might seem too trivial to mention, except
that I think the problems of taxonomy are very common here. I noticed that the subject of
this session is: Just exactly what does a transactional lawyer do? My article and Ron's were
about what “business” lawyers do. And, of course, there is some difference. A lot of what
business lawyers do does not involve transactions. A lot of lawyers do a lot of work that is
involved in transactions and also do a lot of work that is not involved in transactions. Then
there is the question of what is business law. There are an awful lot of areas that are closely
related that might or might not be included. So, one of the big problems here is just to
decide what it is we're talking about before we can describe and understand it.
The Role of Business Lawyers
My remarks will probably be quite brief because, as Ron suggested, we agree on
most things. When I come to his last point, I'm not sure there is a disagreement there either.
Ron's article captured a lot of truth and of course, as he said, it was written before anyone
else had even addressed this issue. So it's quite remarkable. I didn't think he had captured
the whole truth, and furthermore, I thought that the profession had changed and was
continuing to change with the emergence of venture capital, leveraged buyouts, and new
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forms of entity, like the limited liability company and the virtual corporation. And, in a more
general way, there is a difference between distinct, one shot transactions, on one hand, and
on the other hand, repeated transactions between the same parties and relational contracts,
like a joint venture.
And then the next task was to describe the wide variety of functions that business
lawyers perform and, again, it's a long list. Although transaction cost engineering is an
important part of it, there are a number of other tasks involved, like gathering and verifying
material information, and negotiating and drafting agreements. Each of these categories
comprises innumerable specific tasks that vary according to the nature of the matter at hand.
Then, coming closer to what we teach our students, is describing the skills needed
for these tasks. One such skill is helping to decide if a deal should be done at all. If so, the
lawyers help to choose the entity, the scope of the enterprise, the division of control, profits,
and risks, and the issues that Tina Stark has told us that we always have to run through,
including provisions for resolving disputes and provisions for parties to exit or to terminate
the undertaking. Ron also mentioned the problem of identifying agency costs, or
opportunism.
We often mention negotiating skills, but tend not to talk as much as we should
about discussing matters with our own clients. In litigation, it is usually pretty easy to know
what the client wants. If he's the plaintiff, he wants more money. With a business client, it’s
not always clear what exactly the important issues are. How important is it that certain
representations and warranties be true? How important is it that there is a veto or complete
control for one party or another?
Another thing that was mentioned in a couple of the sessions yesterday is that all of
this has to be done with attention to costs. With clients becoming more and more cost
conscious, we need to discuss with students how to be cost effective; how to determine
when it is really worth it to take an additional step.
Enterprise Architect
Ron used the metaphor of the transaction cost engineer. I thought a more accurate
title is enterprise architect. My colleague David Porter, a former corporate partner at Jones
Day, suggested changing this to enterprise engineer because lawyers also implement designs
of their own or of others; they actually build the entities' ramparts and the castle walls as well
as its plumbing.
Distinguishing Business Lawyering from Litigation
What are the pedagogical implications of all this for business lawyering? First, a
general observation. It is based on the sessions that I heard yesterday, so it will hardly come
as a surprise to you in this room. It is how remarkably different the activities of a business
lawyer are from those of a litigator, and how little attention is paid to business lawyering as
opposed to litigation in the law school curriculum, generally, and in the first year of study in
particular.
Now, I teach the basic Business Associations course, as well as a couple of the
advanced courses. A constant problem in the basic Business Association's course is that
students, by habit, think in terms of litigation, not in terms of planning and contracting.
They aren't accustomed to thinking about what may go wrong down the road, including how
someone may behave opportunistically in a business relationship, and they are not used to
thinking about how to prevent or resolve future problems.
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They are also not used to thinking about negotiating outside of litigation. Unlike
litigation, in transactional negotiations the other party can just walk away. And even if the
other party does not walk away, in many cases again the parties are looking to a relational
contract, a joint venture, a venture capital investment, so they are looking to continued
relations down the road. Even if the behavior of the lawyer is not so atrocious as to destroy
the deal, it may be bad enough to sour the relations between the parties.
There was some mention yesterday, consistent with things I have heard before, that
very often business people view lawyers not as deal-makers, but as deal-breakers. When the
parties are getting along just fine, the lawyers come in and start to stir up trouble. That may
be an unjust accusation against business lawyers. It is also claimed by business lawyers that,
in some cases, the parties have agreed at a level of glittering generalities; they are getting
along just fine because they haven't paid any attention to the tough issues. Then, when the
lawyers come along and point out some tough issues, the parties start to have a falling out
and they blame it on the lawyers. But it is nonetheless true, I think, that the kinds of
attitudes one brings into litigation are often inappropriate for the business context, and part
of the job of the business lawyer is not to destroy, but rather to foster, a friendly relationship
between the parties.
Theory Between Structure and Value
That brings me to Ron's last point, and I think it's an interesting one. I don't know
to what extent I agree or disagree with him, in part because I'm not sure exactly what he is
saying, and in part because I am not sure exactly what I think about it myself. But when we
talk about a theory of relationship between structure and value, first of all, I don't know how
much there is available in fields outside of the law to draw from. I know that there is a fair
amount, for example, about the choice of form of strategic alliances. But that's just one part
of what business lawyers do.
Perhaps a more basic problem is that application of theory here may be extremely
difficult because of the infinite variety of business matters. To have a theory that in this
situation you do A, and in that situation you do B works fine if you've got just two choices
and two basic situations. Business lawyers will tell you that every deal varies a little bit from
every other deal and that you have to adjust to those specifics.
At some level of course there is theory. You wouldn't try to organize Microsoft as a
general partnership but that's obvious. When you get to the most difficult situations that
people really do deal with, I wonder if that is the point at which theory no longer works.
But, I know Bill has a number of questions he wants to discuss with us so I will stop
with that.
WILLIAM J. CARNEY
Development of Delaware Law
Just for reference, I'll put up a slide of some of the leading – at least my view –
some of the leading articles in addition to Ron's and George's that contributed, I think, in
many ways, to the debate. And one of them is Steve Schwartz's article,13 where he speaks
generally of the lawyer as somebody who reduces regulatory costs in transactions. Ron
wrote his piece in 1984, when the Delaware courts were about to roll up their sleeves and
13

Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 486 (2007).
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really dig into corporate law, particularly mergers and acquisitions law, and the duties of
directors, and looked rather carefully at contract provisions, all with a very suspicious eye, I
think. And at the end of the day, it's been my observation that not just in M&A deals
involving Delaware corporations, but also in deals involving all corporations, Delaware laws
have had an enormous impact on what the acquisition agreements look like. And the sort of
background law that we all think we have to deal with, even in states where there isn't really
much law, the worst case will probably be Delaware.
Ron, would you think that what's happened in Delaware since you wrote provides a
larger role for the lawyers as a regulatory cost saver?
RONALD J. GILSON
It certainly plays a role; it makes the landscape more complicated in no small
measure because of the fact that Delaware, in my view, has two laws. It has a law that the
Delaware Supreme Court occasionally states, typically in tongues, and then it has the deallawyers’ working law that reflects a continual dialogue with the Chancery Court, grounded in
transactional patterns and market realities that the lawyers and members of the Chancery
Court confront every day. So teaching takeover law doctrine because has become both
dramatically more interesting and more complicated; it reflects the effect of changing market
realities and the sometimes tense interaction between the Supreme Court and the Chancery
Court. But beyond doctrine, the changes in Delaware law have pushed lawyers to be
creative about deal structure. Here is an example. The worst thing that can happen to a
Chancery Court judge is that he or she actually has to make a decision about value. Thus,
recent Chancery Court decisions can be understood as the court pushing the deal lawyers to
design a transaction structure that the court is confident operates to fairly price a deal. If the
deals lawyers ca do so, then the court gets out of having to independently determine value.
Of course, that pushes us back to what Bill, George and I, and I think everyone in the room
too, thinks is most important – that is, the lawyer’s ability to be architect or engineer a
structure that works. In the particular case of Delaware, the audience is somewhat different.
It's not just the client and the party on the other side, but also persuading a bunch of
sophisticated Chancery Court judges that the structure you've created is sufficiently reliable
that the court is relieved of directly reviewing the substance, as opposed to the process, of
the transaction.
WILLIAM J. CARNEY
George, your article (and it seems to me that you and Ron are much closer together
than the two articles suggest separately) suggested the broader role for the lawyer, advisor,
counselor, and planner, absent transactions. I think that's a very valuable addition to the
literature. But essentially, we see a spectrum of activities for the lawyer from counseling
where there is no action or activity taking place, all the way to the one shot deal, and
acquisition agreements as being that kind of representation. Does that make it difficult, or
perhaps impossible, to sort of have a general model of what it is lawyers do? I'll add one
more piece to that and that is the lawyer as a foil. In one of my last roles as a lawyer, I had a
favorite client. He was a free spirited entrepreneur, and sometimes we would go to
negotiations. It would be my job to take the hard line in the opening argument and as soon
as I had done that, Ed would back off and say, “wait a minute, Bill has made it a little
unreasonable here,” and would offer something a little more generous, and the other side
would often leap to take it because the appearance was that he was giving up a lot more than
he really was. I realized that I had become a violin that he played in whatever way he chose

2011]

KEYNOTE DISCUSSION

183

to play me. I didn't mind being a violin; it was a fun role to play. George, can we generalize
in any meaningful way of how lawyers add value?
GEORGE W. DENT, JR.
Well, your first question – does the wide variety of matters handled by business
lawyers make it difficult or impossible generalize? That's easy. Yes, it does. Can we
generalize? I think we certainly need to. How else do we decide what it is our students need
to learn? There is no point in teaching them some narrow set of skills for a particular very
narrow area of practice that they probably will not enter, and even if they do, that will
probably change over time so that what they have learned will not be of much use to them.
So we do have to generalize, but just how we go about it is, I think, a very difficult question.
Can we describe a set of general skills?
Talking to Clients
One thing I mentioned that doesn't come up often in the literature is talking to
clients because that certainly is something that cuts across the practice of all business lawyers
and is something that doesn't come up much in litigation. You don't have to ask your client
in a products liability case, what would you like: more money or less? But in business
transactions, such discussions are very common.
Just to take one small example, with students and young lawyers there is a reluctance
to say to the business people: “It would help me to understand how your business operates
and what it is you're trying to do here in order to help to design the entity and negotiate a
deal that will work for you.” Young lawyers are afraid of sounding stupid if they ask,
“Would you explain your business to me?” And yet when you talk to people who practice in
the area, they will say that asking such questions is absolutely essential. Business clients
often list the fact that lawyers don’t understand their businesses at the top of their
complaints.
That is one small example of how to talk to clients and of the importance of
understanding the business, but then, going beyond that and coming up with a list of general
skills that would be really useful would be a very difficult project.
WILLIAM J. CARNEY
The Future of Business Education
I think I'd like to shift very briefly to my last topic, which is the future of business
law education. I want to talk about some models of business law education that we now
have in law schools and not surprisingly, I begin with Emory’s model, which I can also
describe as “Tina Stark's,” to give credit where credit is due. We have a fairly elaborate
certificate program, which has a schedule of required courses which takes up almost a year
of students’ time after their first year. And they run from the basics of rudimentary
accounting knowledge, a course which can be waived if a student has sufficient experience
elsewhere, through the basic corporate course, and contract drafting, which is something
that most of our students who are in the program will take the first semester of their second
year because it is a prerequisite to deal skills. The other courses along the way are followed
at the end by a capstone course which is either a workshop, a simulation, or we have a series
of field placements with largely corporate clients and a couple of government agencies that
fulfill that requirement.
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So they get a progression of experience, and it is pretty rigid. It is not so rigid that
we haven't had a large demand for it. Tina has a requirement that the 2Ls have an interview
with her and figure out what it is they really want, and I think this year she had 110, which is
50 percent of the rising 2Ls sign up for the interviews, and I think about 75 students were
admitted into the certificate program. So, you know, it is a significant number. It seems to
be playing well in the marketplace.
The next thing is a series of elective courses. Many of those are taught by adjuncts,
and it's a pretty rich array for those who want to add to that set. But we have consumed
almost one year of their total law program if they go that route. The elective courses
continue with workshops that are the capstone classes, and the field placements are with
corporations and with the SEC and the IRS and the Federal Reserve Bank. So that's the
group that we have. It is a fairly structured program and requires a commitment to a lot of
hours.
Case Western’s program is a bit different. I think it is 8 hours of required courses
and then an additional 7 credits, so that makes about 15 hours, which is considerably less
and considerably more flexible for the students, to Stanford's, which represents kind of the
ultimate flexibility. It is just a grouping, I think, as best I can tell in the catalog, and I assume
some advising along the way about what students might want to take.
In contrast, the other end of the spectrum is the Northwestern model of a threeyear JD/MBA program with a full year in the business school. The number of credit hours
required in the law school is 72 hours (I think ours is 90 here), and the others are in the
business school, and that's somewhat reduced, too, I'm sure for the MBA over there. So that
represents the range of models that I am aware of. I would like to know if either of you
gentlemen have any comments on the success or your desires for the future in your own
schools, or what we ought to be doing.
GEORGE W. DENT, JR.
First, it's a great question. Actually, let me back up and even broaden the question if
I may, Bill. Note that in most countries, including most industrialized countries, law is an
undergraduate program, and so some people might well ask if we even need law schools.
Why don't we just get rid of them altogether and stick legal education into the undergraduate
program? And, of course, the other side of that coin is that following the undergraduate law
program, students in other countries serve what is basically a lengthy apprenticeship. So
what is the best way to train young people who want to be business lawyers? A relatively
brief period of general education, followed by long apprenticeship, or a very detailed
program of study carefully prescribed that will turn them out ready to hit the ground
running? It’s a good general question.
Of course, we are hardly disinterested. We want more legal education. When people
start talking about a three year JD/MBA in which students would spend only two years in
law school and one year in a business school, law deans immediately start to ask, what's that
going to do to our income? So those are good questions. There is also a question of what
students want, and what they reasonably want. On one hand, they want to come out of law
school able to get a job. On the other hand, they don't like to be too restricted, especially
early in their law school careers. Now that's not an answer to your question. That is just
more questions, I realize, but I guess that's the best I can offer.
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RONALD J. GILSON
I started out my teaching career thinking that coupling the MBA degree with a law
degree was a great idea (and one I should have taken advantage of). I am less convinced of
that now. One other thing I learned over a lot of years is that you can’t really get someone
else to paint your fence. What law students need to know about business and what MBAs
need to be taught, although they overlap some, are different in focus. The MBA program
doesn't bring to the table the range or theory or set of skills that are not traditionally law but
which a good business lawyer does. Law Schools have to design that curriculum themselves.
Let me frame the issue in a setting. Suppose I want to teach my students how to
choose an exit option for a close corporation. One option is to require arbitration to set
value if the parties cannot agree. A standard pattern is that one selects an arbitrator, the
other side selects an arbitrator, and then the two arbitrator picks a third arbitrator. This is an
expensive process, but probably results in reasonably accurate, non-strategic valuation. But
what about a different process that is really cheap and quick: one person makes an offer, and
the other person gets to buy or sell. Under what circumstances is each technique the best?
There is a game theory literature that talks about how to divide a pie14 I want the
students to walk away from my class with some rules that grow out of theory and help them
identify the circumstances when one of these techniques is likely to be preferable to the
other. They won't get that in the MBA program. They may get some game theory, but it
won't be put in the context that I want them to have it, and that turns out to run pretty
much through the curriculum.
In the end, I think that theory is critical to giving students the ability to select among
options, but I don't find any place else in the university that's likely to apply that theory in a
way that is most effective in training lawyers. A high end professional school is doing
something that nobody else in the university can do for us so, unfortunately, I can't pawn it
off on the business school or on the economics department or the psychology department
to do the interrogative work of taking theory and making it applicable to what our students
are going to be doing in the real world. Nobody else is going to do that hard work for us.
WILLIAM J. CARNEY
We are pretty much out of time if we are going to stay on schedule. I see Tina
nodding, so yes, boss. We will close with this and invite anybody else who has questions.
Sorry we ran out of time for questions. One of the authors in one of the articles I listed, Jeff
Lipshaw, sitting here with his hand ready to go up. Five minutes, okay. I will cut the coffee
break by five minutes.
RONALD J. GILSON
That was a beautiful negotiation.
WILLIAM J. CARNEY
Go on, Jeff. Do you have a question?

Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in
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Yes, I do. [Question regarding the role of theory in teaching transactional law.]
RONALD J. GILSON
My idea of the role that theory plays can be illustrated by the little routine that used
to be done at the beginning of Sesame Street and that I used to watch when my children
were small. There was a board with a picture of nine things and a song was then sung that
one of these things is not like the other. The children were being taught to reason by
analogy, and the technique is quite similar to that reflected in Edward Levi´s classic An
Introduction to Legal Reasoning. In every class I teach, there are students who get it,
who have sense. I expect they got it when were twelve years old, that is, they understood
intuitively into which box each thing went. What I'm deriving from theory, from economics,
from psychology, from finance and the like, is in fact a set of shorthand algorithms that let
the smart kids in the class who just weren't born necessary intuitions, perform the same sorts
of roles, and very effectively.
So where am I going to look? I'm going to take pieces of it from everywhere. So,
for example, it is not in my mind a surprise that the best policy work done with cognitive
psychology and biases was in large part the work of a lawyer although sometimes with an
economist as a co-author. The notion that I can switch default rules, and as a result can help
with individual decision-making is an example of taking an idea that was developed
elsewhere, and bringing it to bear on complex problems that we address in a law school. It
may not extend into a transactional setting, but it doesn't mean it is short theory.
What doesn't happen in the other disciplines, and what makes it, frankly, so much
more fun to be a legal academic, is that our world doesn't fall into little disciplinary boxes.
We deal with real people doing real things; lots of them are rational, lots of them have a little
bit of irrationality, and sometimes we are trying to impose rationality on what is often an
emotional problem, like busting up a two family closed corporation. Law schools may be
the only place in the university where academics truly get rewarded for doing
interdisciplinary work. And that's allowed because we don't have much of a discipline
ourselves, so nobody cares that we are grabbing stuff from elsewhere.
WILLIAM J. CARNEY
And with that, I think I will repeat myself. We have run out of time, and if you have
any questions, come on up.
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